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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
REX HOLLAND, 
REX HOLLAND. Adn1inistrator 'vith 
the Will Annexed of the Estate of 
John G. Holland, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants) 
-vs.-
ARTIIUR E. 1\IORETON, ETHEL 
T. 1IORETON, also knovvn as E. T. 
niORETON, JOHN R. MORETON, 
also known as J. R. MORETON, 
ROSE ANN MORETON, SUSAN 
~IORETON TEVIS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
1 
I 
Civil No. 87 40 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO TI-IE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUS-
TICES OF THE S1~I)REME COURT OF THE STATE 
OF lTTAH: 
The respondents, and each of them, respectfully 
petition this Court for a rehearing on its opinion filed 
in the above entitled cause on July 8, 1960. The grounds 
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2 
for this petition and the points 'vherein the respondents 
allege that this Court has erred are as follo,vs : 
1. The holding of the C~ourt is contrary to the First 
Cause of ..._~ction of plaintiffs' con1plaint, ,\~hich cause the 
plaintiffs elected to sub1nit to the jur:~ in lieu of their 
Seeond Cause of ... ~ction, the Second Cause of .. A.ction be-
ing consistent "'"ith the opinion of the Court, but upon 
'''"hich there has been no trial and one is not. by the direc-
tion of this Court, contemplated. 
:2. By holding that the appellants 'vere not entitled 
to prevail upon the cause of action and theory upon which 
the action \Vas tried to the trial jury, and then to re1nand 
the action 'vith instructions to enter a judgment upon 
a ne'v and different cause of action and theory~ deprives 
the respondent of a jury trial and of property ":ithout 
due process of law and is contrary to Sections 7 and 10 
of Article I and Section 9 of Article \TIII of the Consti-
tlttvon of the State of Utah and to Rule 39(a), [~tah R-ules 
of C1"vN Procedure. 
3. The holding that appellants are entitled to a 
stated a1nount by "'ay of punitive da1nages is arbitrary 
and deprives respondent of a jury trial and of his prop-
erty without due process of la,Y, and is beyond the juris-
diction of this Court and contrary to the constitutional 
provisions and to the rule referred to above .. particularly 
in light of the holding that the theory and eause of action 
upon which the cause was submitted to the jury is erron-
eous. To be consistent, impartial and "-i.thin the concept 
of due process, an a'vard of punitive da1nages, if any 
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there n1ight be, should be left to the trier of the fact upon 
consideration of a eause \vhich recognizes the vested in-
terest of the respondent in and to one-fourth of the pur-
chase price, \vhich the opinion recognizes but \Vhich the 
jury in the instant action "\\·as not pern1itted to consider. 
4. The opinion gives the false impression that the 
statute of li1nitations (Subsection 3, Section 78-12-26, 
L~ tah Code Annotated 1953) \Vas passed upon and deter-
Inined by the jury. In fact the jury \\·as not instructed 
nor did it pass upon the statute of lilnitations. 
5. The opinion restriets the statute of liu1itations 
(Subsection 3, Section 78-12-28, U lah Code L-1 nnotated 
1953) to actual notice on the part of Holland of the al-
leged fraud, the opinion stating: "If the jury had ac-
cepted the defendant's contention that the Hollands kueu· 
the facts * * * the action \Vould have been barred by the 
time it was brought.'' The opinion, in dealing \vith the 
kno\vledge of the Hollands, excludes facts to support the 
contention and the ruling of the trial court to the effect 
that the Hollands \vere put on inquiry ;-;ufficient to charge 
the1n \Yith kno\vledge more than three years before the 
action was commenced. 
6. The opinion does not rationalize or discuss the 
running of the statute of limitations in this action as a 
question of law passed upon by the trial court in support 
of its ruling setting aside the verdict of the jury. The 
Court ignores Rex Holland's own "·ritings of September 
14, 1948, and October 13, 1948, and the telegram fro1n 
~Ir. Moreton of October 8, 1948. The concurring opinion 
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in the appeal fro1n the surnmary judgment in favor of 
Columbia Iron Mining Company imputes to Rex Holland 
knowledge of the total purchase price as of September 
14, 1948. This is ignored in the instant opinion. 
7. The opinion places unjustified emphasis on the 
hearsay conversation with Canfield and on the self-serv-
ing statements by Rex Holland, "\vhich 1vere inadmissible 
as evidence. 
8. The opinion is contrary to law and to the facts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTE~SEN 
HARLEY \\T. GlTSTIX 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
CERTIFIC.._.\.TE 
The attorneys for the petitioning respondents hereby 
certify that this petition for rehearing is made in good 
faith .and not for the purpose of delay. 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
HARLEY W. GUSTIN 
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ARGU~1ENT 
The various points specified above are grouped for 
argument under the follo\\'"ing designations: 
POINT ONE 
'THE MANDATE TO CORRECT AND REINSTATE THE 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF REX HOLLAND IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE AS SUBMITTED 
TO 'THE JURY WAS ERROR. 
The opinion expressly states : 
"The case was submitted on the theory that 
if the jury believed that Moreton breached his 
fiduciary duty and practiced a fraud upon the 
plaintiffs, he \vas to receive none of the purchase 
price; and that it \vould be divided bet-vveen the 
Hollands and Murie, one-third to each. The jury 
found for Rex Holland on this theory and awarded 
hirn one-third of the $287,500 Moreton o htained, 
or $95,833. We think this is error." (Emphasis 
added). 
After the decision of this ·Court in IIolland v. Co-
h~mbia Iron ~~fining Co., ~ lTtah 2d 303, 293 P. 2d 700, 
there remained but two causes of action. The plaintiffs 
were then limited to the First and Second Causes of 
Action as contained in their amended complaint. Para-
graph numbered 2 of the Pretrial Order of October 22, 
1956, so provides (R. 148-150). 
The distinction between the two causes 1s clearly 
defined in the record. 
"THE COURT (Judge I-Ianson): * * ~· Tl1e 
first and second causes of action are the only onp~ 
involved in this suit~~ 
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::\IR. ROBERTS: That is right. The first 
cause is on the theorY there 'vas a breach of the 
confidential relation~hip existing between Mr. 
::\Ioreton and the I-Iollands and because of that 
they are entitled to everything, or that Mr. More-
ton is entitled to nothing, and ''"'e, in that cause, 
ask for judgment for the entire amount, 'vhich 
'vould 1nean -
TJIE COURT: He forfeits his $287,000.00. 
l\fR. ROBERTS: Of course (,,~e) "~ould only be 
entitled to t'vo-thirds of the $387,500.00 under 
that. ·vF e 'vould be entitled to t'Yo-thirds less $66,-
000.00 ''Thich 've have already received . 
. 
The second cause is on the theory that each 
of these persons should have recei\ed a one-fourth 
jnterest in this entire thing. ~Ir. ~Ioreton, along 
'vith them, is entitled to his one-fourth, which 
1neans Rex's share 'vould be entitled to one-fourth 
-$33,333.00 he has already received - and then, 
of course, John Holland's share being sued for by 
Rex as administrator.'' (R. 201-202) 
"niR. G1JSTIN: Isn't there an oYerlapping in the 
first and seeond '? 
~fR.. ROBERTS: There are t'vo different theo-
ries. \\Te couldn't reeover both these sums. That 
is on the theory that :Jir. :Jforeton forfeits any 
co1npensation he reeeived. If 've are not right on 
that, there should be no forfeiture, then 've ask 
for our quarter interest.~~ (R. :202-203). 
''THE COURT: So the reeord is clear, as I under-
stand it, the first cause of action is now the only 
n1atter that is to be submitted to the jury, and 
the runount of punitive dan1ages, if any, is to be 
lin1ited to the extent of $50,000.00, is that rightt 
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~fR. ROBER~rS : That is right. 
jlR. GlTSrr_rx: The first cause of action·; 
~rfiE C0l1RT: Be li1nited entirel,\~ to the first 
cause of action." (R. 960-961). 
The jnr:· by the last paragraph of I11~truetion X o. 6 
(R. 267), was instructed: 
·•In the event said defendant ~Ioreton fails to 
persuade you by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he made the above described disclosure to 
Holland or that he knew or could have known 
frorn con'l:ersat,ions tvith Ill ore ton and yon further 
find fro1n a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant 1foreton 's failure to make the above 
described disclosure \\·as y,Tilful and deliberate 
then you should return a verdict in favor of plain-
tiff and against defendant 1\Ioreton for one-third 
of the amount of 1noney paid by Columbia Iron 
:Jiining Company to the defendant Moreton. That 
figure is the sum of $95,833.00." (R. 267). (Em-
phasis added). 
The 1nandate in the instant action orders the cor-
rection of the judg1nent in favor of Rex 1-Iolland, not on 
the theory of the action as submitted to the jury in the 
court belo\\~, but on the theory of the Second Cause of 
Action, upon which there has been no trial. Instruction 
No. 6 persists "as the law of the case'' not\\·ithstanding 
the so-called correction of the judgrnent. The situation 
thus resulting is an irreconcilable one. ·The Court holds 
that error was committed in permitting the jur.v to find 
on the forfeiture theory, the theory upon vvhich the action 
"\Vas submitted. The jury had no alternative other than 
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to decide the case on the theory of forfeiture or to render 
a verdict of no cause of action. This Court is bound by 
the "la\v of the case" just as \vas the jury. Instruction 
No. 6 inhibits this Court as it did the jury. Petting~ll v. 
Perkins (1954), 2 t'"tah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185, states: 
"Plaintiff asked that the case be tried on 
that theory, that the jury be so instructed, and 
that the jury find their verdict on that basis, and 
the law as so declared. Right or wrong, the in-
structions became the la\v of the case, were bind-
ing upon the jury, on the court and counsel" 
The appeal of Rex Holland is taken fron1 the judg-
nlent which sets aside the verdict and dismisses the action 
in accordance \vith the motion for directed verdict (R. 
304). The present holding of the Court is to the effect 
that it was error to have submitted the case to the jury 
on the forfeiture theory as delineated by the First Cause 
of Action and by Instruction X o. 6. In so holding, this 
Court recognizes the propriety of the trial court's action 
in setting aside the Yerdict of the jury and it then neces-
sarily and logically follo\YS that the judg1nent appealed 
fro1n should be affir1ned. Under the present state of the 
record a ne\v trial is the only affirn1atiYe relief that the 
Court can grant appellants. 
The Inandate is a c.lear departure fron1 Instruction 
No. 6. In Davis 'l'. ltlidcale City (1920), 56 l:tah 1, 189 
P. 7 +, this Court held that unassailed instructions are 
binding upon this Court as \Yell as the court belo\\- and 
the parties litigant. In that case it \vas said: 
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"As stated by appellant, these instructions 
beca1ne the lavv of the case. It is not incumbent 
upon this court to determine their validity· or in-
validity or vvhether the court erred in giving then1 
or not. For the purpose of this case they are 
binding upon this court as vvell as the court belovv 
and the parties litigant." 
In Sierra N ecada Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co. 
( 1916), 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943, tllis Court said : 
"If, on a revievv of the proceedings resulting 
in the judgment, error should be found to plain-
tiff's prejudice, still we would not be authorized to 
enhance the judgment; vve would only reverse 
it and grant a new trial. This is so because vve are 
not authorized, in a lavv case, to try the issues on 
the record and make, or direct, findings, or treat 
as found that which ought to have been found." 
Cases fron1 other jurisdictions are equally decisive: 
Gogg·ins v. Herndon (Idaho 1952), 249 P. 2d 203, 
holds: 
"We must decide the case in accordance with 
the theory of its presentation in the trial court." 
Shumate v. Johnson Puhlishing Company (CaL 
1956), 293 P .2d 531, holds : 
"The theory on which the case was tried in the 
court below must be followed on review.'' 
Cleary ~c. Inrliruza Beach, Inc. (C:C.A. 7), 275 F.2d 
543, holds: 
"Since plaintiff did not submit the case for 
trial on a wilful and wanton theory, he 1nay not 
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no'v rely, in this court, on a ":ilful and 'vanton 
theory for reversal of the judgment." 
U ni:ted States t·. Waechter et al., ( C.C.A. 9, 1952), 
195 F .2d 963, holds : 
"We agree that the govern1nent, 'Yhatever 
1nay he the strength of its present argun1ent, can-
not fairly urge as a ground for reversal a theory 
\vhich j t did not present ''Thile the case 'vas before 
the trial court.'' 
Russell v. Sunb1trst Ref£ning Co. (~Iont. 1928L 272 
P. 998, holds : 
"The Supre1ne Court 'vill revie'v a case upon 
the theory upon 'Yhich it was tried in the district 
court (Smith v. Barnes, 51 :Jiont. 202, 149 P. 963, 
Ann. Cas. 1917D, 330), and in determining "'hat 
that theory 'vas resort n1ay be had to the instruc-
tions "Thich the court 'Yas requested to give. 
* * * 
It is therefore apparent that the plaintiff's 
theory on the trial of the case \Yas that, in order 
to prevail, he n1ust by the evidence which he intro-
duced bring hin1self within one of the conditions 
nan1ed in this instruction~ and that, if he did not 
do so, the verdict of the jury must necessarily go 
for the defendant.'' 
The holding of this Court to the effect that the jury 
could not return a verdict on the theory of forfeiture is 
in accord \Yith the ruling of the trial court setting aside 
the jury verdict and entering judgn1ent in aceordance 'vith 
the motion for a directed verdict. This Court sustains 
the action of the trial court and yet, contrary to all pre-
cedent, re,vrites the verdict, then directs the entry of the 
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verdict as re\vritten, not considering it to be bound by the 
la \V of the case. 
Having determined that Rex Holland cannot prevail 
upon the theory submitted to the jury as reflected by In-
struction 6, the Court can only affirm the decision of the 
trial court. This Court, as stated in Sierra Nevada Mill 
Co. v. J(evth O'Brieu, supra, is not authorized to try the 
issues on the record and make or direct findings or treat 
as found that which ought to have been found. 
In 3 Ant. Jur., Appeal and Error, Section 1218, page 
720, it is said: 
"Generally, it may be said that \vhen it ap-
pears that the plaintiff can probably make a 
better showing on his trial, the court, upon re-
versing the judgment, should re1nand it for a 
ne\v trial. But the court is required to re1nand 
for a new trial only when a nevv trial is neces-
sary. That condi:tion, however, is always deemed 
to exist, as to a jury case, when, ~tnder any cir-
cumstances, a new trial mi.ght res1tlt otherwise 
than in s~tch a j~tdgment bet"vn,rJ awarded as W'Otttld 
have been rendered before had the error or 
errors not been committed.'' (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court did not set aside the jury· verdict 
~;. on the statute of lin1itations alone. Its ruling \Vas suf-
~ ficiently comprehensive to include the holding of this 
Court that Rex Holland could not prevail upon his theory 
11 of forfeiture. That being the s_tate of the record there 
~ can be no reversal. Furthermore, the plaintiff elected 
~: to submit the action on the theory now determined to 
m· be untenable and he should not now be entitled to prevail 
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short of a new trial upon the theory of his Second 
Cause of Action, \vhich theory he elected not to pursue 
at the trial level. 
POINT II. 
THE OPINION IS CONTRARY TO THE ENUMERAT'ED 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
The effect of the opinion is to direct the entry of 
a judgment upon plaintiffs' Second Cause of ..._t\_ction in 
favor of Rex Holland. In so doing the Court ignores 
the fundamental right of trial by jury and compounds 
the basic error, if such can be done, by arbitrarily as-
sessing an award of $25,000.00 as punitive damages as 
if the case had been tried and presented to the trier 
of the fact on the theory that ~Ir. nioreton had a vested 
interest. 
The op1n1on recognizes that !fr. !foreton became 
vested with ownership of a one-fourth interest in the 
1nining claims. "He is therefore entitled to his fair 
proportion of the price for ,,~hich they \Yere sold." Under 
this connotation the Court presumes to say that the 
jury, if the action had been tried on that theory~ would 
have a\Yarded $25,000.00 by \Yay of punitive damages. 
The award that the jury n1ade \Yas based upon the 
theory that l\[r. !Ioreton had no interest in the claims 
or any interest in the purchase price. On that theory, 
and justifiably so, the Court holds the verdict to have 
been erroneous. By the srune token it should be said 
that the jury's concept of punitive dan1age "~as in error. 
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Had the jury been instructed on the theory that 
nlr. 1Ioreton did in fact obtain the patents to the claims 
as he agreed, and therefore under the agreement of 
ownership becan1e vested with an interest in the clain1s 
and in the purchase price, the jury's view of the puni-
tive side of the action could well have been different. 
The incredible silence of Rex Holland after his letter 
to Dr. Mathesius "\vherein he stated that he "\vas advised 
of 25¢ per ton being the prevailing price, his kno,vledge 
of the estimated tonnage at 1.55 million tons and after 
the telegram fro1n I\1r. I\:foreton to be hereafter referred 
to, and in which telegram Mr. Moreton stated that he 
'vas bargaining for as much as he could get for his 
O\Yn interest in addition to the fixed amount for the 
Holland interest, could be argued as showing bad faith 
on Rex Holland's part and good faith on the part of 
~Ir. 1Ioreton. Rex Holland remained silent at the closing 
of the transaction after he had been alerted to the 
fact that :11r. Moreton "ras actually receiving more 
than an equal fourth of the transaction. Rex Holland's 
silence could be said to have been a trap to enable 
hi1n to thereafter change his position, once having se-
cured his portion of the $100,000.00 for which he had 
bargained. 
These observations are not intended to persuade 
this Court on the merits of the controversy as the prob-
lem is inherently one for the trier of the fact. It is 
the prerogative of the trier of the fact under appropri-
ate instructions, if by a jury, to determine good faith 
or the want of it and the propriety or i1npropriety under 
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all of the circu1nstances gojng to the a\vard of punitive 
da1nages. The appellate court on appeal is limited to 
"questions of la\v alone.'' Section 9, .L~rticle VIII, Co·n-
stitution of the State of Utah. 
Had the jury been instructed that in determining 
co1npensatory damage it should include interest at the 
rate of G% per annum fro1n the 20th day of December, 
1948, and that the a\\~ard of punitive da1nages should 
not he disproportionate to the actual damage sustained 
or should bear son1e relation to the injury complained 
of and the cause thereof, as held in Falkenberg v. A"Teff 
(1928), 72 Utah 258, 169 P. 1008, its concept of the 
a "Tard of $25,000.00 might have been different. 
This Court, in changing the theory upon which 
I-Iolland 1night recover and stating a ne\Y pre1nise of 
actual drunage, adhering nevertheless to the former 
a\vard of punitive da1nages, deprives respondent fron1 
a jury determination of the relationship between the 
punitive dan1age and the actual damage, an important 
facet that the jury alone has the right to determine. 
Further1nore, the ·Court in reducing the an1ount of the 
actual da1nage has, in effect, increased proportionately 
the an1ount of the punitive damage. ''llile this Court 
has, in some instances, reduced the runount of punitive 
dan1age as being disproportionate to the actual damage, 
we kno'v of no case "~here the Court has increased the 
a1nount of punitive damage. 
Correcting the judgment to add interest at 6% 
from Dece1nber 1948 to the date of the verdict in July 
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1957 adds almost 50% of the principal sum of $63,542.00 
to the verdict. Under proper instructions the jury 'vould 
have been permitted to \veigh the circtunstance of ap-
proximately $30,000.00 in interest in its consideration 
of a punitive award, if any. 
In Ostertag r. Lallfont (1959), 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 
P.2d 1022 this Court said: 
"As with damages for injuries generally, 
there is no method for exact calculation as to 
punitive damages, nor is there any precise forin-
ula for the relationship of punitive damages to 
actual damages. The jury from its advantaged 
position n1ust necessarily be allo\ved a broad 
discretion in such Ina tters. It is true that this 
court has stated a number of times that the 
punitive damages n1ust bear some reasonable 
relationship to actual da1uages. This is so becausp 
they must not be so disproportionate as to n1ani-
fest that they "\vere R\varded as a result of 
passion or prejudice, or under misconception of, 
or in disregard of the la"\v or the evidence. But 
the relationship of the punitive damages to actual 
damages a\varded is only one of the facts to be 
considered in deterrnining whether the an1ount 
awarded should be sustained." 
In Fell v. lTnvon Pac. Ry. Co. (1907), 32 lTtah 101, 
88 P. 1003, the Court, by way of dicta, calls attention 
to the fact that there are cases where both interest and 
exemplary damages are not allo\ved. The east- contain~ 
the follo\ving: 
"General justice is never promoted by an 
effort to reach it by ignoring sound principles 
of la\v in particular cases. Whenever possible, 
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it ought not be left to the mere caprice of either 
court or jury to either grant or \vithhold that 
which is due. A fixed rule, 'vhen based on sound 
principles, is, in most instances, a safer guide 
than the judgment of a few individuals, however 
honest or pure their motives.'' 
The opinion as it is no\v \vritten deprives ~Ir. 
~Ioreton of his property \vithout due process of law, 
and in so doing usurps the function of the trier of 
the fact in regard to punitive damage. The opinion as 
no\v \Vritten is authority for the proposition that an 
appellate court can make an R\vard of punitive damages 
on a cause or a theory not presented to or passed upon 
by the lo\Yer court. 
In the case of }.;"orback c. Board of Directors of 
Church Extension Society (1934), 84 "Ctah 514, 37 P.2d 
339, it is stated: 
HThat either party to an action at law has 
the right to a trial by jur~~ when timely and 
properly demanded is supported by the law' and 
the decided cases." 
The Supren1e Court of the l.,..nited States in the case 
of Jacob r. City of ~.., eu' I ... ork. 315 l~.S. 732, 86 L.ed 
1166, states: 
'~The right of jury trial in ciYil cases at 
co1nn1on la\v is a basic and fundaJ.nental feature 
of our systen1 of federal jurisprudence \Yhich is 
protected by the Seventh An1en<hnent. A right so 
fundrunental and sacred to the citizen, "'"hether 
guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by 
statute, should be jealously guarded by the 
courts.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
In Badon v. Suh/rnLann (1958), 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 
P.2d 826, this Court held that an R\vard of $100.00 to 
a twenty year old man \vho contracted a mild case of 
trichinosis should be increased to $500.00 on condition 
that if the defendant refused to accept the increase a 
new trial would be ordered. The appeal was taken on 
the grounds of inadequacy of the award. The dissenting 
opinion forcibly attacks the additur and calls attention 
to the fact that "To date the only relief in such cases 
has been to grant a new trial." The dissenter goes fur-
ther and points out that in permitting such procedure 
and granting the relief asked for for the first time 
on appeal this Court assumes the role of a trial court 
and indulges a procedure that is a stranger to both 
the trial court and the record. 
"In 1ny opinion, this decision gives the court 
a po\ver it never had and one that trespasses 
into constitutional territory involving denial of 
both a jury trial and due process. It lays down 
what I think is a dangerous rule, that, even 
\Vhere no one seeks the relief, we, who were not 
particeps at the trial, can grant a new trial 
unless defendant pays a sum we arbitrarily set, 
forcing the plaintiff, who has absolutely no 
choice in the matter, to take· the added amount 
\vithout any possibility of having a jury pass 
on the matter." 
The opinion in the instant case does not involve an 
additur but does "trespass into constitutional territory 
involving denial of both a jury trial and due process'' 
to an extent far greater than is pointed out by the 
dissenting opinion in the B odon case. In fact the instant 
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opinion einasculates all concept of the right to a jury trial 
and of due process. The judgment ordered to be cor-
rected and the verdict ordered to be modified are upon 
a theory not presently before the ·Court and not passed 
upon at the level of the trial court. It is just as if 
there had been no trial and the parties 'vere appearing 
before this Court, asking for relief on the premise that 
thi~ Court is of original and general jurisdiction. 
POINT III. 
'THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The opinion implies that the trial court vacated 
the jury verdict and dismissed the Rex Holland action 
upon the sole ground that the action 'vas not brought 
'vithin three years after the discovery of the fraud. 
While this Court says that the action of the trial court 
'YaH "apparently upon the ground" of the statute of 
limitations, the trial court did not expressly so state. 
The motion contained several other grounds including 
the contention that Rex Holland "-as not entitled to 
prevail upon the theory of his action a~ subn1itted to 
the jury, and on 'Yhieh ground this Court, by it~ opinion, 
concurs. 
The n1otion for a directed Yerdict made under Rule 
50, [Jtah Ru,les of Civil Procedure, is found on pages 
237 through 242 of the record. A further ground was 
urged at page 958 of the record. The motion to set 
aside the verdict and for a judgn1ent of disurissal found 
at pag<-' ~S7 of the record adopts the grounds stated 
both in 'vriting and orally on the 1notion for a directed 
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verdict, and then calls specific attention to the fact 
that ~·the evidence is insufficient in la'v to form a basis 
for the verdict rendered and the sa1ne is against law ... " 
This Court is in accord "ith the latter state1nent in 
holding· that Rex Holland cannot recover on the for-
feiture theory. 
The order and judgtnen t of the trial court ( R. 292-
294) setting aside the verdict of the jury and dis1nissing 
the Rex Holland action does not delineate the grounds, 
except as it incorporates the motion for a directed 
verdict. The opinion of this Court therefore inaccur-
ately suggests that the motion was granted by reason 
of the trial court's concept of the statute of limitations 
and does further injustice to the record by not pointing 
out that there 'vere other grounds prompting the dis-
missal, including the proposition that the verdict \\ras 
in error in awarding Rex Holland one-third of the entire 
purchase price. 
The opinion furthers the suggestion that the trial 
court dismissed the action on the sole ground of the 
statute of limitations 
"We see no basis in the record to justify a 
ruling by the trial court as a matter of law that 
the plaintiffs had knowledge of fraud more than 
three years before the action 'vas commenced.", 
which expression is found in the same paragraph that 
gives emphasis to the hearsay conversation with Canfield 
and the self-serving statement that Canfield later "al-
layed'' Rex Holland's apprehension. 
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Tlu~ Court makes no reference to nor does it at-
tempt to rationalize the Rex Holland letter to Dr. 
l\1athesius of September 14, 1948, and the telegram 
from ~1r. l\[oreton to Holland on October 8, 1948, in 
concluding that the record was insufficient to justify 
a ruling as a matter of la\Y that the plaintiffs had 
knowledge of fraud more than three years before the 
action was commenced. On the concept that this Court 
will do no conscious \vrong, we cannot do other than 
conclude that the omission of any reference to the 
Rex Holland letter of September 14, 1948, and to ~Ir. 
l\1oreton's telegram to Holland of October 8, 1948, 
when making specific reference to the Canfield conver-
sations, was an inadvertence. If the letter of September 
14, 1948, and the telegran1 of October 8, 1948, had 
been in the 1nind of the Court "hen "\vriting the opinion, 
the Court \vould certainly not have said that there was 
"no basis in the record to justify" a ruling by the trial 
court as a n1atter of la\v that the plaintiffs had lmowl-
edge of fraud n1ore than three years before the action 
'vas commenced. 
The ,\ ... ashington Court In Re Sach"nzan·s Estate 
(1949), 210 P.2d 682, reiterates the fan1iliar rule as 
follo"~s: 
'~In Noyes v. Parsons~ 104 '''ash. 594, 177 
P. (i5l, G54 the court said, in part : 'The broad 
assertion that thP statute does not run until the 
fraud i8 diseovered is not tenable. The statute 
begins to run when the fraud sho·uld hare been 
dvscorercd, and a clue to the fact which ~¥ fol-
lo~rcd 11p diligently u·o~uld lead to discorerp ·is 
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in law equivalent to discovery. Deering v. Hol-
comb, supra (26 Wash. 588, 67 P. 240, 561). A 
general allegation of ignorance at one time and 
knowledge at another is of no effect.' " 
Instruction G requires a disclosure to Holland from 
conversations 1vith ltf ore ton. In the same vein the 
opinion ignores the rule just above stated and holds 
that the statute does not run until the Hollands "knew 
the facts." In the same paragraph the opinion implies 
that the jury was instructed as to the statute of limita-
ions, which is not the fact. 
The record does not justify the statement in the 
opinion that "the running of the statute of limitations 
of three years for actions in fraud is closely tied to 
the jury's findings on the primary issue of whether a 
fraud was perpetrated" and "the jury chose to believe 
the plaintiffs' evidence which was to the effect that they 
did not know the facts at the time of the transaction 
and that the first knowledge they had of the true facts 
was in October 1951.'' 
The letter of September 14, 1948, Exhibit P 14, 
IS characterized in the concurring opinion in Holland 
v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., supra, as follows: 
"In this connection it is significant to re-
meinber that in Rex Holland's letter of Septem-
ber 14th he had said that Moreton misrepresented 
the price at 10 cents per ton, whereas, Hollands 
claimed it should have been 25 cents per ton. 
Twenty-five cents per ton was the price actually 
paid and the only evidence in the record is that 
this was equal to the highest price 'Columbia paid 
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for iron ore to anyone in the area. The simplest 
mathematical calculation 'vould have sho"rn that 
25 cents per ton x 1.55 million tons totals $387,500, 
which calculation Rex Holland could easilv have 
made, as is apparent fron1 the contents ·of the 
Septe1nber 14th letter itself." 
The telegra1n from ~I:r. :Jioreton to Rex Holland 
under date of October 8, 19±8, the receipt "~hereof is 
admitted by Rex Holland (R. 506), puts Holland square-
ly on notiee that l\f r. :Jioreton "~as bargaining for as 
much as he could get for his vested one-fourth interest 
in addition to the fixed amount for the Holland in-
terests (R. 238, 505 and Respondents' Brief page 73). 
The telegran1 of October 8, 1948, 'vas not before the 
Court in Holland 1/. Columbia Iron ll!i-ning Co.~ supra, 
and therefore does not con1e under the referenee to 
that ease in considering the fartual baekgrotmd, to 
"'"hich case the reader of the opinion in the instant ease 
j~ referred for Hsuch further facts as are necessary to 
the disposition of the issues presented on tllis appeal." 
The telegran1, coupled "~ith R.ex Holland's letter to Dr. 
1\fathesius of Septe1nber 1-t 19-±8. jn1putes lmn,vledge 
to Rex Holland "~ithin the connotation of the opinion 
that if the Hollands kneu· the facts the statute would 
have eoininenced to run at that ti1ne. In any event, the 
lettPr to Dr. l\lathesius and the telegran1 fro1n :J.Ir. 
l\foreton cannot be expunged fro1n the record, or s'vept 
under the rng ~o to speak, by the staten1ent: 
•· ''r r ~re no ba~is in the record to justify a ruling by the 
trin l court as a 1uatter of la"~ that the plaintiffs had 
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~ kno,vledge of fraud n1ore than three years before the 
action \Vas c.onunenced.'' 
In addition to Rex Holland's letter to Dr. l\Ja thesius 
and the telegran1 frorn I\[r. :1Ioreton there is Exhibit 
P 19, a letter signed by Rex I--Iolland, hi~ rnother, father 
and niurie under date of October 13, 19±8, addressed 
to Colurnbia Iron ~fining Cornpany. The letter \vas in-
troduced in evidence by Rex Holland (R. 388) and in 
point of tin1e is one rnonth after the alleged conversa-
tion with ·Canfield on September 1-±, 1948, \Vhen Can-
field is said to have stated that iron ore "Tas bringing 
25¢ a ton \Yhic.h conversation prompted the letter to Dr. 
:Jiathesius ( R. 38:2). The letter of October 13, 19-±8, reads 
in part: 
"Accordingly \Ve entered into an Agreernent 
\vith :Jir. 1Loreton for the patenting of said claims. 
At the time the tonnage in said claims, and 
n1ore particularly the prospect for sale, if any, 
and the purchase price, if sale could be made 
when such patent \Yas received, were uncertain 
and speculative, as a result of which the return 
to I\Ir. ~{oreton would necessarily be contingent. 
Our Agreement with Mr. Moreton pro:vides 
that in consideration of his assistance in holding 
these claims and his patenting the same, at his 
sole cost and expense, and other good and valu-
able considerations, which we have heretofore 
received frorn him, that he shall receive for his 
interest in said claims, all of the purchase price 
which may be received for said claims in excess 
of $100,000.00 (which amount was fixed by us), 
the said sum of $100,000.00 to be received by 
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us, as and for our full share of the purchase 
price of said claims, and for all our interest in 
said claims." 
The above should be compared with Rex Holland's 
own handwritten letter to Dr. ~1athesius on Septen1ber 
14, 1948, Exhibit P 14, which states in part: 
"Ever since the property has been diamond 
drilled Mr. ~Ioreton has made us believe that there 
was only One Million, Four Hundred Thousand 
( 1,400,000) tons of iron ore contained in this 
deposit. 
\\"'" e agreed to accept $100,000.00 for this 
property based upon that tonnage and have 
signed Articles of Agreement that will expire at 
the end of September, 1948. Sinee we signed the 
Agreen1ent "\Ye have been advised that instead 
of One ~Iillion, Four Hundred Thousand tons of 
iron upon the property there are ·Three ~iillion 
Five Hundred Thousand tons of iron ore and 
that it is being offered for sale for .25c per 
ton or a total sales price of $875~000.00. 
Therefore 1\Ir. l\Ioreton has, through mis-
leading us about the total tonnage, had us sign 
an Agreement that "\vill net hin1 $773,000.00 for 
a $700.00 investn1ent. 
''Till you consider postponing the purchase of 
the property until after R ove1nber 1st, 1948 and 
notify 1\lr. l\Ioreton that the sale has been can-
celed·. This "~in then give tune for the Agreen1ent 
bet\\·c~en us to expire. ''T e "~ill then den1and that 
the sniP be~ 1nade on an equal basis***.~· 
The lettPr of October l~i~ l~l+S. \Yns not before the 
Court in If olla nd r. C'ol nnl,biJa Iron Jl i·nin,o (Yo .• snpra (R. 
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R 389) and has undoubtedly been overlooked by the Court 
~~~!- in the instant action when it says: 
~'We see no basis in the record to justify a 
ruling by the trial court as a matter of law that 
the plaintiffs had knowledge of fraud more than 
three years before the action \Vas commenced." 
,~ The ·words of the opinion "\V e see no basis in the record 
to justify" the ruling of the trial court on the statute 
of lirnitations encon1pass the entire record \\i.thout quali-
fication. 
After the letter of September 14, 1948, to Dr. ~iathes­
Ius there "Tas nothing done or said by Mr. Moreton 
or by Columbia Iron Mining Company, or anyone else, 
to dissuade Rex Holland from the suggestion that the 
prevailing rate was 25¢ per ton, except Holland's own 
self-serving statement as to his state of mind gleaned 
from the hearsay conversation with Canfield (R. 384) 
some two weeks after the first conversation (R. 382). 
Canfield did not repudiate the price of 25¢ per ton, and 
over objection, Holland was permitted to say that he con-
cluded that there was no basis upon which to esti111ate 
the tons of ore in the property and "if he (·Canfield) 
\Vas not correct on the tons, then how could he be correct 
on the price.'' (R. 384.) 
"Q (Rex Holland) Now, did you come to any 
conclusion in your own mind, at that time, 
or thereafter, with respect to the price of 
25 cents~ 
MR. GUSTIN: Now, we must object to that. 
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TilE cor:nrr: The objection "~in be SUS-
stained on that. 
* * * 
Q (By 1Ir. Roberts) After your conversation 
'vith l\Ir. Canfield, 'vhat 'vas your state of 
mind with respect to the price of this ore y 
l\fR. GliSTIX: \V e n1ust object to that, 
your Honor. 
THE COl'RT: Objection overruled. (R. 
383). 
* * * 
A Yes, I understand your question on that. At 
that time he had quoted me a figure of 
3,500,000 tons, 'vhich I thought he was re-
ferring only to the :J[ & H clain1s. And then 
later on he tells me that he had not meant 
it 'vas in the I\1: & H claims alone, but it 
was in the con1plete ore body. So, I con-
cluded that he had no basis at all on which 
to base his estimated tons of ore in that 
property, and, if he was not correct on the 
tons, then ho"- r.ould he be correct on the 
price. 
THE C01TRT: No"r, I\Ir. Roberts, is that 
all that you are going to ask in this con-
nection'? 
l\1R. R.OBERTS: Yes. your Honor. 
T11E COl~RT: :J[rs. Harbrecht, and gentle-
lnen of the jury. the purpose of adn1itting 
this te~tin1onY at this tune is n1erelv to show 
t hr state of ~nind of the plaintiff, !Ir. Holl-
and, and you are not to assu1ne fron1 his 
state1nents. as to the truth or correctness 
of the a1nount of tonnage, etr. The only 
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purpose of adrnitting this testirnony is to go 
to ~fr. Holland's state of rnind in connection 
\vith this conversation on this body of ore. 
* * * 
~IR. ROBERTS: ~1r. Pollack has called my 
attention to one question I didn't ask in 
connection \vith the sarne rnatter, if I rnight 
retract rny statement I was through, and 
ask one more matter. 
Tl1E COURT: As long as the jury under-
stands this is merely to go to the state of 
rnind, and not to the (R. 384) facts, as far 
as the tonnage is concerned. I think those 
have been established in the pre-trial, so 
there is no question -
1IR. POLLACK: That is correct. 
THE COURT: - as to the amount of the 
tonnage and the price per ton. 
i\IR. PO LLA:CI{: : That is correct. 
~IR. ROBERTS: ·The price has not been 
established. It was just the quantity. 
THE. COURT: Go ahead with your ques-
tion. 
Q (By Mr. Roberts) At this time, or after 
this second conversation with Mr. Canfield, 
what was the state of your mind as far as 
Mr. Moreton was concerned, and what he had 
told you concerning the price~ 
l\fR. GUSTIN: Now, your Honor, again, in 
addition to the objection urged in ;Chambers, 
we must add here that that reaches out into 
the mind of another person, and it is in-
competent in the conclusion. 
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MR. ROBERTS: I certainly did not mean 
to reach anybody else's mind. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled 
subject to my previous statement to the jury: 
~IR. GUSTIK: :llf~y the reporter read it, 
rather than repeat it. 
A I concluded then that Mr. Canfield had no 
basis-
lviR. ROBERTS: K o, no. My question goes 
directly to the state of your mind as far as 
lvlr. Moreton was concerned. 
A That 1\Ir. l\Ioreton had advised us correctly 
as to the (R. 385) tonnage and the price of 
the ore in the M & H claims." (R. 386) 
\v-r e envision a petition for rehearing and the rule 
"~j th respect thereto as a 1neans ".,.hereby the Court can 
correct and rectify an inadvertence or error in its own 
decision. Here \ve have three docmnents that haYe a 
direct hearing on the statute of lin1itations and there is 
no specific reference to the sa1ne in the opinion. True, 
the letter to Dr. ~Iathesius is con11nented on in Holland 
v. Colunzbia Irron 11/iniug c·a. and giYen special consid-
eration in the eoneurring decision, \vhich decision 'ras 
concurred in hy the " 7Titer of the opinion in the instant 
aetion. Asstuning that it can be said that the letter to 
Dr. l\~lathesius \YTitten bY Rex Holland 'yas not \vortln .. 
. . 
of eo1n1n0nt in deter1nining the propriety of the trial 
court's ruling, can thf' other docu1nents be so treated? 
The tel<.\ grain fro1n l\[ r. l\Ioreton is ne\\ .. to the case and 
h~, it a reasonable 1nind is put on inquiry. It plays 
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an in1portant part, not only on the issue of fraud but 
on the running of the statute of limitations. It has been 
inadvertently o1nitted in the ·Court's consideration of 
the pro blen1. 
Exhibit P 19, the letter signed by Rex Holland on 
October 13, 1948, charges hin1 'vith kno,vledge of the 
tonnage involved and reasserts his disclai1ner to any 
dollar an1ount to be received by :Thir. ~foreton over and 
above the sum of $100,000.00. This letter U'as introd1£ced 
by the plaintiff hin~self) not on cross-exan1ination but 
as a part of his case in chief. 
Not to n1ention the letter or to rationalize the 
san1e 'vith the contentions urged before the Court is 
n1ost certainly an inadvertance and one that should 
be rectified in order to maintain the integrity of the 
record, and then, if the Court can say that it sees no 
basis in the record to justify the ruling of the trial 
court, the litigants cannot say, on that score, that matters 
of consequence have been ignored or overlooked. 
POINT IV. 
THE OPINION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND TO THE 
FACTS. 
(a) The opinion recognizes Mr. Moreton's vested 
interest in one-fourth of the purchase price. It flows 
from the bargain for an undivided one-fourth of the 
mining claims as subsequently patented, but the opinion 
gives no effect to his option to purchase the remaining 
three-fourths, a part of the same transaction. The in-
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consistency is compounded by a 1nisstatement of the 
contractual arrange1nent, the opinion stating: 
"It also recited that if the sale was 'slightly 
in excess' of $133,000 ~Ioreton could have the 
excess as compensation for his option to purchase 
their interests.'' (En1phasis added.) 
In connection '"ith a reconsideration of this case, 
we feel obliged to say 'vith reference to the above 0\V!l-
ership Agree1nent, that it did not so provide as quoted 
above, but on the contrary, provided that nioreton 'vould 
have all the excess over $100,000. The quotation above 
was the testi1nony of Rex Holland in contradiction to 
the expressed tern1s of the 'vritten agreement to 'vhich 
testnnony tiinely objection "~as made. There is no linri-
tation in the written agreement as to "~hat ~Ioreton should 
receive over and above the specified smn of $100,000, 
if sold on a tonnage basis as they indisputably "~ere 
so sold. 
We further feel obliged to call to the court's at-
tention Holland's letter to ~I oreton of date Deeen1ber 
15, 1951, (Ex. P-24, to be found on pages .A--±7~ A48 
and A49 of our original brief). "rherein he stated, and 
in ae<·ordance 'vith his oral testin1ony. H,,~e decided we 
'YPrP ""illing to take the $100,000 and you should get 
$60,000 * * * "Thirh 've 'vere led to believe was the 
total a1nount reeeived fron1 that sale, 'rhich additional 
a1nount \\7onld equal close to $75,000 no'v that the 
tax<'~ havP been paid h~T you on that additional an1ount 
$287,000. ~' 
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It is not understandable ho\v the court could, or 
would a\vard I-Iolland more than he clai1ned. It is fur-
ther not understandable ho\V interest could be allo"red to 
Holland on the amount of the total su1n R\varded hin1 
when as a u1atter of la\v Holland \vould had to 
have paid 5% state inco1ne tax and :23% federal inco1ne 
tax by April 1, 19-±9. It is clearly 1nanifest that this 
court's decision a\varded to Holland 1nore than he hiln-
self claimed. 
The portion of the op1n1on quoted above, \vhile 
a1nbiguous, departs fron1 the true co1nmitment to the 
effect that the patenting of the clain1s \\Tas the con-
sideration for the acquisition of the one-fourth interest 
and for the option to acquire the remaining three-fourths 
interest. All of the \Yritings are to that effect and 
there is no effort made in the instant case to set any 
of then1 aside (R. 626 and 665). The option is an 
integral part of the contract vesting the one-fourth 
interest and cannot be treated separately or ignored. 
This is the holding of this Court in Moody v. Sn1ith 
(1959), 9 1Jtah 2d 139, 340 P. 2d 83, \Vhere the Court 
states: 
"Plaintiff's attack is directed against the 
existence of the option clause, and this allegedly 
challenges the creation of a contract. Inspection 
does not support such a conclusion; the option 
is an integral part of a larger eontract, the lease. 
This encompassing lease was admittedly a valid 
and binding agreement and \vould unquestionably 
be altered and varied should any change be made 
in the meaning or effect of the option." 
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(b) The opinion as presently \Yritten is on the 
theory of plaintiff's Second Cause of Action \vhich he 
elected to forego in the interest of his misconceived 
First Cause of Action \vhere he looked to recover on 
the extrernely punitive theory of forfeiture. The casual 
reader of the opinion would not be R\vare of the election 
as between the First and Second Causes of Action. 
What the 'Court has done cannot be said to be a mere 
coincidence as bet\veen the two causes or to be recon-
ciled b~~ the language that the verdict '~should be nlodi-
fied'' and the remanding of the case "for correction 
of the judgment." l~nder the guise of "correction" and 
of "1nodification" the Court has substituted the Second 
Cause of Action contrary to the la-\\~ of the case, has 
deprived _jir. ~foreton of a trial by jury on issues not 
presented at the trial level, including the issue of puni-
tive dan1ages. Property is taken 'vithout due process 
of la \Y·. The opinion departs fron1 the record made in 
the court belo"~ in violation of constitutional provisions 
and of the statutes and rules pro1nulgated thereunder. 
(c) The direction of a ne\v and rensed judg1nent 
in this action prevents ~Ir. l\Ioreton fron1 testing in 
any 1nanner \Yhatsoever the legality of the san1e tmder 
previous}~¥ accepted and recognized standards laid dow~ 
by the constitution and la\Ys of this State~ including 
the decisions of this Court. ..A.Jnong other things~ Jlr. 
Moreton is dc~priYed of a direct attack upon Instruction 
No. 6A (R. 268), \Yhich is clearly erroneous as to the 
eonePpt of punitive damage, the hearsay and self-serving 
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Canfield-Rex Holland purported conversation, the meth-
od used by appellants to get before the jury as a fact 
the so-called "confidence restored'' aspect of the Can-
field conversation which this Court says "allayed" 
Holland's apprehensions, and that such \Vas admissable 
as a state of mind. Those matters, including the approach 
that is reasonably available on the theory of contract 
and 1nany other matters, are swept aside by the opinion 
as it is no'v 'vritten, resulting in a deprivation of rights 
of a litigant under the concept of due process. 
(d) The dissenting opinion points out in no un-
certain terms the basic fallacy of the 1najority holding. 
\Vhen able jurists disagree as to \vhether "'fraud" has 
or has not been disclosed by the record, it strengthens 
the contention that fraud is not sho"rn by clear and 
convincing evidence. The criticis1n leveled at the Ina-
jority opinion by the dissenter, coupled with the in-
consistencies and the procedural difficulties pointed 
out above and the treatment of the punitive da1nages, 
should, we respectfully suggest, be sufficient to cause the 
Court to again revie'v the entire record in order that 
no injustice be done. 
The petition for rehearing should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
HARLEY W. GUSTIN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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